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Summary
Sri Lanka is a constitutional democracy with relatively high educational and
social standards.  The country’s political, social, and economic development has been
seriously constrained by two decades of ethnic conflict between the majority
Sinhalese and minority Tamil ethnic groups.  Since 1983, a separatist war costing
some 64,000 lives has been waged against government forces by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a well-organized rebel group that has been seeking
to establish a separate state in the Tamil-dominated areas of the north and east.  
The current Norwegian-brokered peace process has produced notable successes.
In February 2002, a permanent cease-fire was reached and has been observed by both
sides.  In September, the Colombo government and the LTTE held their first peace
talks in 7 years, with the LTTE indicating for the first time that it is willing to accept
autonomy rather than independence for Tamil-majority regions.  The two sides have
agreed in principle to seek a solution through a federal structure.  However, political
rivalry between President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe could
hinder peace efforts; government troops continue to occupy large swaths of Tamil-
speaking territory; and there remain doubts about the willingness of the LTTE to
renounce the use of force and disarm.  The United States designated the LTTE as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997 and demands that the Tigers lay down
their arms and foreswear the use of force before that status can change.  
U.S. policy supports efforts to reform Sri Lanka’s democratic political system
in a way that provides for full political participation of all communities; it does not
endorse the establishment of another independent state on the island.  The United
States regarded as “extremely positive” the December 2002 announcement that
parties to the Sri Lanka conflict have agreed to seek settlement through establishment
of a federal governmental structure.  It has vowed to play a role in multilateral efforts
to settle the conflict  and to assist in the rebuilding of war-torn areas.  The United
States and Sri Lanka signed a new Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) in 2002, and U.S. trade-related bodies have since been active in efforts to
boost bilateral ties.  The two countries also maintain military-to-military relations.
This report will be updated periodically.
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SRI LANKA IN BRIEF
Population: 19.6 million (2002 est.)
growth rate: 0.85% (2002 est.)
Area: 65,610 sq. km. (about size of West Virginia)
Capital: Colombo
Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese 74%; Tamil 18%; Arab 7%;
other 1%
Language: Sinhala (official and national language);
Tamil (national language); English widely used
Religion: Buddhist 70%; Hindu 15%; Christian 8%;
Muslim 7% (1999 est.)
Life Expectancy at Birth: female 75.0 years; male
69.8 years (2002 est.)
Literacy: female 89.3%; male 94.5% (2001)
Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $56.5 billion; per
capita: $3,060; growth rate 3.2% (2002)
Inflation: 9.6% (2002)
U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $1.81 billion; imports
from U.S. $172  million (2002)
Sources: CIA World Factbook;  U.S. Department of Commerce;
World Bank; Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight
Sri Lanka:
 Background and U.S. Relations
This report provides historical, political, and economic background on Sri Lanka
and examines U.S.-Sri Lankan relations and policy concerns.  Congressional interest
in Sri Lanka focuses on the current peace process that seeks to end a two-decade-old
civil war, terrorist activity, human rights, and U.S. appropriations for food, economic,
and military assistance.
Recent Developments
On February 6, three LTTE rebels incinerated themselves at sea as Norwegian
truce monitors boarded their weapons-laden craft.  The cease-fire violation failed to
derail a fifth round of peace negotiations held in Berlin during the same week.  
On March 10, a Sri Lankan Navy vessel sank what the Colombo government
described as a hostile Tiger boat, killing 11.  The Tigers condemned the attack,
claiming that their unarmed “merchant vessel” was not a threat.  It is not clear
whether the incident took place in international waters or whether the Tiger boat were
carrying weapons. The incident failed to deter a sixth round of peace talks held in
Japan March 18-21.  The talks focused on power and tax revenue sharing, but
produced no breakthroughs.
On March 21, a spokeswoman for the main opposition People’s Alliance party
claimed that U.S. President Bush and British PM Blair are “war criminals for going
to war without United Nations
approval.”
On March 25, Deputy Secretary
of State Armitage met with two
senior Sri Lankan cabinet ministers
in Washington where he reiterated
his strong support for the peace
process and said he was pleased
with its continued progress.
In March, the World Bank
established a special North East
Reconstruction Fund  and pledged
its “unconditional support” for Sri
Lanka’s development programs.  A
new Country Assistance Strategy
(CAS) was announced on April 1,
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the first for Sri Lanka since 1996.  Organized around the central themes of peace,
growth, and equity, the CAS includes $800 million in grants and interest-free loans
over the next four years, more than tripling average annual World Bank lending to
Sri Lanka since 1998.  The United States will host a potential donor country briefing
in Washington on April 14 in preparation for the scheduled June donor conference
in Tokyo.
Historical Setting
Once a port of call on ancient maritime trade routes, Sri Lanka is located in the
Indian Ocean off the southeastern tip of India’s Deccan Peninsula.  The island nation
was settled by successive waves of migration from India beginning in the 5th century
BCE.  Indo-Aryans from northern India established Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms in
the central part of the island.  Tamil Hindus from southern India settled in the
northeastern coastal areas, establishing a kingdom in the Jaffna Peninsula.  Beginning
in the 16th century, Sri Lanka was colonized in succession by the Portuguese, Dutch,
and English, becoming the British crown colony of Ceylon in 1802.  In the late 19th
century, Tamil laborers were brought from India to work British tea and rubber
plantations in the southern highlands.  Known as Indian Tamils, the descendants of
these workers currently comprise 6% of the population, while descendants of earlier
Tamil arrivals, known as Sri Lankan Tamils, constitute 12% of the population. 
Although Ceylon gained its independence from Britain peacefully in 1948, the
succeeding decades have been marred by conflict between the country’s mostly
Buddhist Sinhalese majority and predominantly Hindu Tamil minority.  Following
independence, the Tamils – who had attained educational and civil service
predominance under the British – increasingly found themselves discriminated
against by the Sinhalese-dominated government, which made Sinhala the sole official
language and gave preferences to Sinhalese in university admissions and government
jobs.  The Sinhalese, who had deeply resented British favoritism toward the Tamils,
saw themselves not as the majority, however, but as a minority in a large Tamil sea
that included the 50 million Tamils across the strait in India’s southern state of Tamil
Nadu.  In 1972, Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka (“resplendent land”), as it was known
in Indian epic literature.
Political Situation
Sri Lanka’s political life has long featured a struggle between two broad
umbrella parties – the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party
(UNP) – both dominated by prominent family clusters.  Since independence, the two
parties have frequently alternated in power.  Initially, Sri Lanka followed the
Westminster parliamentary model.  In 1978, however, the UNP instituted a strong
executive presidential system of government.  Under this French-style system, the
popularly elected President has the power to dissolve the 225-member unicameral
parliament and call new elections, as well as to appoint the prime minister and
cabinet.  President Chandrika Kumaratunga – leader of the SLFP and daughter of two
former prime ministers – was re-elected to a second six-year term in December 1999,
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1 Dayan Candappa, “New Sri Lanka Premier Sworn In Pledging Peace,”Reuters News,
December 9, 2001.
three days after she lost vision in one eye in a Tamil separatist suicide bombing that
killed 26 and injured more than 100.  
Although Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance (PA) coalition won a narrow victory
in the October 2000 parliamentary elections, a year later she was forced to dissolve
parliament and call for new elections in order to avoid a no-confidence vote.  In the
resulting December 2001 parliamentary elections, the UNP won 109 seats (to 77 for
the PA) and formed a majority coalition – called the United National Front (UNF)
government – with the Tamil National Alliance (15 seats) and the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (5 seats).  UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe pledged
to open talks with the Tamil rebels and to resuscitate the ailing Sri Lankan economy.1
Ethnic Conflict
The combination of communal politics, as practiced by both Sinhalese and
Tamil political leaders, and deteriorating economic conditions created deep schisms
in Sri Lankan society.  By the 1970s, the government was facing Tamil unrest in the
north and east, while a Sinhalese Marxist group waged a terrorist campaign in the
central and southern regions.  Periodic rioting against Tamils spawned the creation
of militant Tamil groups that sought to establish by force a Tamil homeland that
would include the Northern and Eastern provinces.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), led by its charismatic founder and chief strategist
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, emerged as the strongest and best organized of these groups.
A full-scale separatist war broke out in the north following July 1983 riots in
which several thousand Tamils were killed in retaliation for the slaying of 13
Sinhalese soldiers by Tamil militants.   Two decades of war have claimed some
64,000 lives and displaced between 800,000 and 1.6 million people.  LTTE forces,
estimated at up to 10,000 men and women in strength, are armed with long-range
artillery, mortars, and antiaircraft weapons, and control portions of the Northern
Province and some coastal areas of the Eastern Province.  A small but effective naval
contingent, known as the Sea Tigers, includes speedboats, fishing vessels, and
underwater demolition teams.  Weapons reportedly have been obtained through
illegal arms markets in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and from captured Sri
Lankan forces.  Financial support for the LTTE reportedly has come from the
worldwide diaspora of Tamil emigres, as well as from smuggling and legitimate
businesses.  Tamil Tiger suicide bombers are believed responsible for the
assassination of numerous Sri Lankan political leaders, including Sri Lankan
President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1993, and many moderate Tamil leaders
who opposed the LTTE.  Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, whose efforts
to assist Sri Lanka in enforcing a peace accord with the Tamils in 1987 ended in the
deaths of over 1,000 Indian troops, was assassinated in May 1991 by an alleged
LTTE suicide bombing.  One leading scholar claims that the LTTE is responsible for
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2 Cited in Amy Waldman, “Suicide Bombing Masters: Sri Lankan Rebels,” New York Times,
January 14, 2003.
3 Amal Jayasinghe, “Sri Lanka Lifts Ban on Tigers Ahead of Thai Talks,” Agence France-
Presse, September 4, 2002.
4 “Sri Lankans in Reconstruction Talks,” BBC News, November 18, 2002.  Large numbers
of Tamil refugees have already begun returning to the war-torn region since the February
2002 cease-fire (Dilip Ganguly, “100,000 Refugees Return to Sri Lanka,” Associated Press
Newswire, September 20, 2002).
5 “Transcript: U.S. Prepared to ‘Play Its Part’ to Further Peace in Sri Lanka,” USIS
Washington File, November 25, 2002.
fully half of all suicide attacks worldwide in recent years.2  Four previous attempts
at a peaceful settlement ended in failure and violence.
Peace Process
Progress
The current Norwegian-brokered peace effort, which began in 1999, has
produced notable success since Prime Minister Wickremesinghe revived the process
upon taking office in late-2001.  In February 2002, a permanent cease-fire was
reached and, despite several incidents of alleged violations, has since been observed
by both sides.  In addition, confidence-building measures called for under the cease-
fire have been implemented.  In April, LTTE leader Prabhakaran emerged from
hiding for his first press conference in 12 years and suggested for the first time that
the LTTE would be willing to settle for less than full Tamil independence.  In
September, Sri Lanka lifted its 1998 ban on the LTTE, a move which the Tigers had
demanded as a pre-condition for peace talks.  Buddhist clerics and the JVP, however,
have opposed negotiating with the LTTE.3
In September 2002, at a naval base in Thailand, the Colombo government and
the LTTE held their first peace talks in 7 years.  The meeting, which resulted in an
agreement to establish a joint task force for humanitarian and reconstruction
activities, was deemed successful by both sides.  On the third day of talks, the LTTE
announced that it would settle for “internal self-determination” and “substantial
regional autonomy” for the Tamil population rather than full independence – a major
shift in the rebels’ position.  A second round of talks in October-November brought
another breakthrough when the two sides agreed on a framework for seeking foreign
aid to rebuild the country (officials estimate that repairing the war-damaged
infrastructure in the island’s northeast could cost as much as $500 million4).  A
multilateral “donor conference” in Oslo in late November brought numerous pledges
of external assistance, with the United States promising to “play its part” toward
implementation of a peace plan.5
In what may be the most important breakthrough to date, talks in early
December 2002 ended with the issuance of a statement that “the parties have agreed
to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in the
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7 “Sri Lankan Peace Talks Start in Berlin,” Reuters News, February 7, 2003; Amal
Jayasinghe, “Suicide Bomb Blunts Sri Lanka’s Peace Momentum,” Agence France-Presse,
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Sides Over Sea Clash,” Reuters News, March 17, 2003.
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“Overwhelming Support for Peace Talks – Poll,” Daily News (Colombo), March 24, 2003.
areas of historical habituation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal
structure within a united Sri Lanka.”6  This language marks significant concession
from both parties:  the Colombo government for the first time accepted the idea of
federalism, and the rebels, in accepting a call for internal self-determination, appear
to have relinquished their decades-old pursuit of an independent Tamil state.
A fifth round of negotiations took place in Berlin February 6-8, 2003, but made
no notable progress other than to schedule further talks on revenue sharing issues.
The meetings began only three hours after three LTTE rebels incinerated themselves
at sea when Norwegian truce monitors boarded their weapons-laden craft.  Although
“very clearly a violation of the cease-fire,” the incident did not derail the peace
process; it did, however, erode somewhat international confidence, especially among
potential donor nations.  The United States called the Tigers’ arms smuggling effort
“highly destabilizing” and urged the LTTE to “commit itself fully to peace and desist
from arms resupply efforts.”7
Talks in Japan from March 18-21 produced no major breakthroughs on political
or human rights issues.  Norwegian brokers noted that the main purpose of the
meetings was to lay a foundation for a donor conference that Japan has offered to
host in early June.  A Japanese participant suggested that the promise of major
external assistance is what has kept the disputing parties at the negotiating table.  As
in February, violence again threatened to derail the process.  On March 10, a Sri
Lankan Navy vessel sank what the Colombo government described as an attacking
Tiger boat, killing 11.  The Tigers condemned the attack, claiming that their unarmed
“merchant vessel” was not a threat.  It is not clear whether the incident took place in
international waters or whether the Tiger boat were carrying munitions.  Norwegian
truce monitors criticized both sides while refraining from ruling who was at fault.8
On April 3, the Colombo government said that it is considering holding an
island-wide referendum to endorse its current peace negotiations with Tamil rebels.
The non-binding referendum would endorse new legislation known as the Peace Bill;
a second referendum would be required to make any necessary constitutional
changes.  A public opinion poll found that nearly 84% of all Sri Lankans believe that
peace can be achieved through peace talks, including more than 95% of Tamils.9
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Obstacles
Despite the unexpectedly rapid pace of progress in peace talks and the seeming
consensus that Sri Lankan unity be maintained, negotiators face a difficult
circumstance ahead in attempting to balance what traditionally has been a highly
centralized Sri Lankan political system against the Tamil minority’s desire for
substantive autonomy.10  A variety of federal models are under consideration,
including those that have seen success in Switzerland, Canada, and Papua New
Guinea, among others.11  In addition to questions of power-sharing, numerous other
highly contentious issues to be settled include geographical region, human rights
protection, political and administrative mechanisms, public finance, law and order,
and LTTE accountability for past actions.12
A key unresolved near-term issue is the decommissioning of LTTE weapons,
which the Tigers repeatedly have stated will not occur until a permanent settlement
is reached.  The opposition People’s Alliance claims that the rebels are “armed to the
teeth” and must disarm as part of the negotiation process.13  Also, there are reported
to be 35,000 government troops controlling as much as one-third of the Jaffna
Peninsula at the island’s northern tip.  The Tigers have refused to make peace while
part of the country remains under “army occupation,” but the Sri Lankan military is
concerned that any resettlement of civilians could be used as cover by the Tigers to
better position themselves should fighting resume.14  Colombo is refusing to open up
the “high security zones” until the rebels lay down their arms, an action the Tigers
call “non-negotiable” at this stage.15  Some analysts express certainty that the Tigers
will be unwilling to disarm in the foreseeable future, and many believe that the Tigers
are continuing recruitment and arms procurement efforts in violation of the February
2002 cease-fire agreement to maintain the military balance.16
A potential obstacle to a peace deal in the near- and middle-term is the
continuing political rivalry between President Kumaratunga, who has criticized the
prime minister’s conciliatory approach toward the LTTE, and PM Wickremesinghe,
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whose UNF cabinet has accused the president of corruption and violating government
procedures.  In September 2002, amid concern that Kumaratunga could effectively
veto any peace accord by disbanding parliament, Wickremesinghe’s government
proposed a constitutional change – the 19th Amendment – that would remove the
president’s power to dissolve the legislature.  Although some legislators from
Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance have expressed support for the amendment, many
observers maintain that it will be difficult for Wickremesinghe – whose coalition
controls 129 seats – to win the 21 PA votes needed to secure a two-thirds majority.
The People’s Alliance has expressed concerns that the Norwegian mediators are
biased in favor of the rebels, and that the United States and Britain are “planning to
reward terrorism.”  It states that it will no longer countenance developments which
“jeopardize the country’s sovereignty.”17  Kumaratunga herself, while at times
expressing approval of the ongoing process, has complained that Oslo’s role in
assisting the LTTE’s December procurement of a powerful FM radio transmitter
raised serious questions about Norway’s impartiality.18  Press reports indicate that the
Tigers will use the new equipment to extend their radio broadcasts into government-
controlled regions for the first time since the civil war began; some critics say the
move provides the rebels with an influential propaganda tool.19
Economy
Formerly a colonial economy based on plantation crops (tea, rubber, coconut,
sugar, and rice), modern Sri Lanka’s manufactured products account for nearly 80%
of the country’s exports, including garments, textiles, gems, and agricultural
products.  Tourism and repatriated earnings of Sri Lankans employed abroad are
other important foreign exchange earners.  The first country in South Asia to
liberalize its economy, Sri Lanka began an ongoing process of market reform and
privatization of state-owned industries in 1977.  Privatization efforts have slowed in
recent years, however.  In 2001, both tourism and investor confidence, on the
rebound in 1999, were seriously affected by major LTTE terrorist attacks and
political instability.  The October 2002 Bali bombings likely will further damage the
tourist sector.  Sri Lanka’s entire economy also suffered as a result of prolonged
drought (the worst in two decades), related hydroelectric power shortages, and the
worldwide economic downturn.
Sri Lanka experienced its first recorded recession ever in 2001, with a negative
GDP growth rate of -1.4%, down sharply from 5.4% in 2000.  The country’s fiscal
deficit, which increased from 9.9% in 2000 to 10.8% in 2001, is expected to be
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limited to 8.5% in 2002.  The Colombo government has had difficulty controlling
inflation, which reached 9.6% for the 2002 calendar year.20  Estimates for economic
growth in 2002 indicate a modest recovery of 3.1%.  Further improvement is
expected in 2003, with most estimates standing at something more than 4% growth.
Success with renewed privatization efforts and progress in the current peace process
will do much to spur greater economic growth in Sri Lanka.  Despite the existence
of a promising government-LTTE negotiations, Sri Lanka’s civil war continues to
place a heavy burden on the country’s economy, as well as to hinder its economic
potential.  Many analysts believe that annual growth rates would be as much as three
percentage points higher in the absence of protracted ethnic conflict.21
With its location on major sea-lanes, excellent harbors, and high educational
standards, Sri Lanka has long been viewed as a potential regional center for financial
and export-oriented services.  In recent years, however, defense expenditures have
risen from 1.3% of GDP in 1980 to 4-6% of GDP.  Aside from defense spending,
other costs of the war include damage to infrastructure, expenditures for
humanitarian relief, and impact on tourism and foreign investment.  For decades, Sri
Lanka has invested heavily in education, health, and social welfare, maintaining high
living standards compared to much of South Asia. 
U.S. Relations and Policy Concerns  
U.S. policy supports efforts to reform Sri Lanka’s democratic political system
in a way that provides for full political participation of all communities; it does not
endorse the establishment of another independent state on the island.  The United
States regarded as “extremely positive” the December 2002 announcement that
parties to the Sri Lanka conflict have agreed to seek settlement through establishment
of a federal governmental structure.  While commending both the Sri Lankan
president and prime minster for their respective roles in the peace process, the United
States emphasizes that further progress requires the Colombo government to “move
together as one.”  Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has taken a lead role in U.S.-
Sri Lankan relations, arguing that, “The United States should be playing a role in
concert with other nations, committing our human and financial resources to settling
this conflict because it can be done. And because it’s the right thing to do.”22
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Bilateral Relations
The U.S. State Department first designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization in 1997.23  In February 2003, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage
reiterated that “if the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the past and make
a convincing case through its conduct and its actual actions that it is committed to a
political solution and to peace, the United States will certainly consider removing the
LTTE from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, as well as any other terrorism-
related designations.”  The LTTE continues to reject all calls that it renounce
violence, saying it will do so only when “the aspirations of [the Tamil] people are
met by a political settlement.”24  The global anti-terrorism campaign, which
reportedly has resulted in the international withholding of roughly $4 billion from the
LTTE and made it more difficult for the group to acquire weapons, has been cited as
a likely factor in the rebel’s decision to enter into peace negotiations.25
In July 2002, President Bush met with Sri Lankan PM  Wickremesinghe at the
White House and pledged U.S. support for peace and economic development in Sri
Lanka.  It was the first visit to Washington by a Sri Lankan leader since 1984.  In
Colombo in August, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage pledged to “re-energize”
bilateral relations through increased cooperation in defense, education, commerce,
justice, and human rights.  In September, a U.S. defense assessment team was sent
to examine the training needs of the Sri Lankan military, and State Department
Coordinator for Counterterrorism Taylor went to Colombo to discuss ways to
integrate “intelligence, law enforcement, legal and diplomatic efforts against
terrorism.”  The United States and Sri Lanka held their ninth consecutive joint
military exercises from January-March 2003, with training focused on combined
arms operations and medical techniques.26
Trade, Investment, and Aid
The United States is Sri Lanka’s largest export market and the destination for
about 40% of its total exports and 60% of its garment exports.  In 2002, Sri Lankan
exports to the United States were valued at $1.81 billion (down slightly from 2001),
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29 Telephonic interview with U.S. Trade Representative official, April 9, 2003.
led by apparel and textiles, leather products, and rubber.  U.S. exports to Sri Lanka
in 2002 were valued at $172 million, and included wheat, electrical machinery,
fabrics, and medical instruments.  The Sri Lankan Board of Investment indicates that
some 90 U.S.-based companies operate in Sri Lanka with an estimated investment
of more than $500 million.  
During the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s visit to Washington
in July 2002, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a new Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) to establish “a forum for Sri Lanka and the United
States to examine ways to expand bilateral trade and investment.”  The agreement
“creates a Joint Council to enable officials to consider a wide range of
commercial issues, and sets out basic principles underlying the two nations’ trade
and investments relationship.”  The Council also will “establish a permanent
dialogue with the expectation of expanding trade and investment between the
United States and Sri Lanka.”27
In subsequent months, several teams of U.S. officials have traveled to Sri Lanka
to explore avenues for cooperation.  During a November 2002 trip to Colombo, U.S.
Deputy Trade Representative Jon Huntsman asserted that the island must make its
investment regime more transparent and predictable if it is to attract greater U.S.
private investment.  In December, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade
Development William Lash was in Colombo to encourage increased bilateral ties in
the areas of information technology, education, and infrastructure.  In February 2003,
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage asserted that “Sri Lanka is already a
solid exporter to the United States and has the potential with peace and the right
reforms to become a significant trade partner.”28  In March 2003, the second round
of TIFA Joint Council meetings were held in Washington, where Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Huntsman and Sri Lankan Commerce Minister Karunanayake led
their respective delegations.  The tenor of these meetings was wholly positive and
“progress was made on issues of concern to both countries.”29
U.S. foreign assistance to Sri Lanka focuses on increasing the country’s
economic competitiveness in the global marketplace; creating and enhancing
economic and social opportunities for disadvantaged groups; promoting peace, good
governance, and human rights awareness and enforcement; providing psychological
counseling to communities in the conflict zones; and demining.  U.S. foreign
assistance to Sri Lanka in FY2002 (excluding loans) totaled $8.4 million (and
another $1.3 million in food aid).  The Bush Administration requested $10.4 million
for FY2003 and nearly $24 million for FY2004, including $14 million in Economic
Support Funds and $1 million for a new Foreign Military Financing program.
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Agency for International Development, “Budget Justification to the Congress, FY2003.” 
31 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002:  Sri
Lanka,” March 2003.
32 See Amy Waldman, “Sri Lanka’s Young Are Forced to Fill Ranks of Endless Rebellion,”
New York Times, January 6, 2003; John Lancaster, “In Some Ways, Rebels Without a
Cause,” Washington Post, January 14, 2003.  One report has the Tigers admitting to
recruiting more than 300 child soldiers during 2002, despite the cease-fire (“Tamil tigers
‘Admit Recruiting Children,’” BBC News, January 28, 2003).
USAID currently is running a two-year, $7 million program aimed at increasing Sri
Lanka’s competitiveness in the marketplace.30
Human Rights Concerns
The U.S. State Department, in its Sri Lanka Country Report on Human Rights
Practices, 2002 (issued March 2003), determined that the Colombo government
“generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, there were serious
problems in some areas. ... Some members of the security forces committed serious
human rights abuses.”31  Major problems included torture of detainees and poor
prison conditions; infringements on privacy rights; violence and discrimination
against women; child prostitution and child labor; and human trafficking, among
others.  Improvement was found in some areas:  the independence of the judiciary
was respected, and government bodies have undertaken to address and investigate
abuses such as torture.  The United States also finds that the LTTE “continued to
commit serious human rights abuses” in 2002, including “unlawful” killings,
disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, extortion, and torture.  The LTTE
reportedly continues to recruit child soldiers, to restrict freedom of movement, and
to censor the media in areas under its control.32  The government, on the other hand,
relaxed some of its restrictions on freedom of the press by ending its censorship of
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Figure 1.  Map of Sri Lanka
